New Delhi, Oct 26 (IANS) Just a year back, Bangladesh’s political landscape took a decisive turn—the country’s Gen Zs toppled the 15-year rule of Sheikh Hasina who is now referred in Bangladesh as the ‘autocrat’ or ‘fascist’. The 2024 July Uprising was not just a mere change of political regime, but it brought back the discussions on which direction of Bangladesh’s state building should head.
However, this is not the first uprising the country witnessed since its independence—one very well remembers the 1990 anti-Ershad movement that restored civilian rule in Bangladesh.
Nevertheless, autocracy is seen to run deep in Bangladesh’s political culture, given its history military dictatorial regime, which explains why, like its former counterpart Pakistan, Bangladesh continues to face a democracy deficit.
With talks on democracy back in the political discourse rooted in the need for reforms to outdo all past evils, a National Consensus Commission (NCC) was established in February to formulate a new charter—the July Charter—a reform blueprint at restructuring democratic institutions placed by six reform commissions, based on the consensus of all political parties.
A prelude to July Charter is the July Declaration, unveiled by the chief advisor Muhammad Yunus on 5 August, marking the first anniversary of the 2024 Uprising. The 28-point framework announced in presence of representatives of all major parties, however, was less about the ‘spirit’ of Uprising and more about a fatwa against the now banned Awami League, repudiating its role right from the 1971 Liberation War to Hasina’s rule.
The declaration indeed was a conglomeration of all criticisms against Awami League party by its political opponents, while resorting to a one-dimensional interpretation of political history.
Moreover, it framed the interim government to be ‘constitutionally’ formed under Yunus’s leadership despite its non-constitutional status, thereby, legitimising its rule. The July Declaration now aims to have constitutional recognition, expectedly in the Preamble of a new Constitution. While the legal basis of July Declaration remains unclear and contested, one can notice that the push for its constitutional recognition is not only to potentially protect anti-Hasina forces but also the non-constitutional interim government in future.
Consensus talks between the National Consensus Commission (NCC) and 33 political parties officially started in March. In the first round of talks that ended in May, parties reached consensus on 62 out of 166 proposals, most centred on judicial reforms and restructuring of the Anti-Corruption Commission. The second round of talks then began in July on 20 core issues (marked as most important) where parties failed to reach consensus in the first round.
The issue-based discussions, aiming at finalising the charter, however, agreed on 13 out of 20 core reforms, again failing to reach consensus on all fundamental reform proposals. The disagreements continued on proposals of reserved seats for women in parliament, electoral process and powers of upper house in a bicameral legislature, fundamental principles of state, outline of a caretaker government, expansion of fundamental rights of citizens in the constitution, electoral process and powers of the president and the constitutional inclusion of provisions for appointing of four key institutions—Public Service Commission, the Anti-Corruption Commission, the Comptroller and Auditor General, and the Ombudsman.
The final round of talks, started in August now with 30 political parties, focused on the implementation of the charter. The political parties were handed the draft of the charter stating their commitment to implement the reform proposals within two months of formation of a new government via next election. However, the differences among political parties, reflected in the rounds of consensus talk, only buttressed.
Initially, disputes emerged over several key areas with respect to the charter’s legal and constitutional status. While Islamic parties and the National Citizen’s Party (NCP) demanded for immediate legal status of the charter, Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and smaller parties opposed the same without parliamentary discussion. Although parties finally reached consensus on implementing the July Charter through a referendum on 5 October, disagreements followed regarding its timing. Islamic parties and the NCP wanted referendum before national election (scheduled in February), left parties wanted referendum before charter’s legal enactment while the BNP favoured referendum after the national election.
The NCC sent the final version of the July Charter to political parties, scheduling the date of signing the charter on 17 October. The final draft contains three sections—the first outlines the charter background, the second contains 84 reform proposals and the third contains a seven-point pledge for implementation of the charter, while leaving out on the methods of implementation.
As deadlock remain unresolved, the NCC called for an emergency meeting with the political parties, headed by the chief advisor. The July Charter has been signed on 17 October with consensus reached only one-third of reform proposals. However, the NCP refused to sign the July Charter, citing lack of legal enforceability and four left parties refused the same on grounds of non-inclusion of four basic principles of the constitution.
Those who signed the charter, including the BNP and Jamat-e-Islami, added formal notes of dissents on about two-thirds of reforms proposals where they have reservations.
Right from the starting of the consensus talks till its signing, Bangladesh witnessed its political parties more polarised than ever. The only consensus among political parties noted has been on the need for reforms. None of the political parties displayed willingness to compromise—the very essence of reaching a consensus. Instead, the consensus debates only revealed political parties fighting to secure its political future with impunity.
Political parties like Jamaat-e-Islami and other Islamic parties, and even the NCP have any at times taken to the streets to push for their demands on July Charter, contrary to dialogue and discussion process on basis of which that the consensus commission was established in the first place. They even threatened to stall election if their demand for legal recognition of July Charter is not met, along with other demands.
This reveals that Bangladesh’s political culture is still haunted by its violent and undemocratic past. Moreover, the persisting lawlessness and brawl among political parties leave little room to believe that Bangladesh has attained its ‘second liberation’.
The national election is slated to be held in February. However, the statement of the July Charter raises concern if the country will even witness an election. Concerns have already been raised by many that delaying election would drag Bangladesh into greater political uncertainty.
The haste on signing the July Charter, left its existence still hanging, risking Bangladesh’s democratic transition. What was supposed to be a charter based on consensus, thus, became a charter without one. Even if a national election does take place in February, it is certain that the country’s democracy will struggle its survival.
–IANS
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