New Delhi, Sep 18 (IANS) On 2 September 2025, Quetta once again became the stage of brutal violence when a suicide bomber struck a rally of the Balochistan National Party-Mengal (BNP-M), killing at least 14 people and injuring more than 30.
The Islamic State Pakistan Province (ISPP), a branch of the so-called Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), immediately claimed responsibility.
For many outside observers, this seemed like yet another tragic terror attack in Pakistan’s most volatile province.
But for those who have long tracked the patterns of violence in Balochistan, it represented something far more disturbing: the culmination of years of Pakistani state policy that has deliberately allowed transnational jihadist groups to grow while targeting nationalist voices demanding rights for Baloch people.
The attack was not a random act of terror; it was the product of a strategy that has repeatedly favored militant Islamists over secular, nationalist, and democratic movements.
For decades, the Pakistan Army and its intelligence wings have seen Baloch nationalism as a greater threat than extremist religious militancy.
The demands of the Baloch people have consistently centered on political autonomy, economic justice, and an end to the exploitation of their land and resources by Islamabad. Rather than responding with dialogue or reforms, the state has unleashed waves of military operations, enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, and a policy of divide-and-rule.
In this environment of repression, international jihadist organizations have been given either tacit approval or outright support to act as counterweights against the Baloch struggle.
Groups like ISKP-ISPP thrive precisely because the Pakistani military establishment sees them as useful tools to weaken and delegitimize Baloch nationalist forces.
The Quetta bombing of September 2025 was a direct reflection of this cynical calculation. The target was not a military installation or a state office but a political gathering of BNP-M, one of the largest and most moderate nationalist parties in the province.
BNP-M has historically chosen the path of electoral politics, working within Pakistan’s constitutional framework despite systemic discrimination against the Baloch.
Yet even this moderate nationalism is intolerable for a military establishment that wishes to crush any sense of Baloch identity or demands for autonomy. By allowing ISKP-ISPP to operate in Balochistan, the Pakistan Army effectively enables attacks against groups like BNP-M while keeping its own hands clean.
The narrative then becomes one of “global terrorism”, not state repression, and the Army continues to claim legitimacy as the sole guarantor of Pakistan’s stability.
The historical record is full of evidence pointing to the way Pakistan’s military rulers have used extremist groups as instruments of policy.
From the Taliban in Afghanistan to sectarian outfits in Punjab, the Army has consistently backed those who espouse religious fanaticism while treating ethnic nationalists and secular activists as existential enemies.
In Balochistan, this strategy has been devastating.
While entire villages are bulldozed in counterinsurgency campaigns and thousands of young men vanish into the dungeons of intelligence agencies, madrassas and extremist outfits are given space to expand. It is therefore no coincidence that ISKP-ISPP was able to establish strongholds in Balochistan despite the heavy presence of the Army and Frontier Corps.
The Pakistani state is quick to crush any sign of Baloch dissent but mysteriously incapable of dismantling the networks of radical jihadists who openly pledge allegiance to ISIS.
The BNP-M rally attack illustrates the security vacuum that Pakistan has deliberately cultivated. Quetta is one of the most heavily militarized cities in the country, with checkpoints, intelligence posts, and Army patrols everywhere.
For a suicide bomber to reach a political rally and detonate himself in such an environment shows either colossal incompetence or, more plausibly, complicity.
The Army’s history suggests the latter. By enabling jihadists to target Baloch groups, the military establishment ensures that nationalist politics remains delegitimized, associated with violence, and deprived of any safe space to flourish.
Every time ISKP-ISPP strikes in Balochistan, the ultimate beneficiaries are the generals in Rawalpindi, who use the chaos to tighten their grip and deflect international scrutiny from their abuses.
The Pakistan Army’s duplicity becomes clearer when one examines its propaganda. On one hand, the military paints itself as fighting terrorism, seeking billions in aid and weapons from foreign powers under the guise of counterterrorism.
On the other, it has a long record of nurturing and tolerating terrorist organizations as proxies. This duality is central to its strategy in Balochistan. When Baloch nationalists organize peaceful rallies or demand a fair share of resources from gas fields and Gwadar port, they are met with bullets and abductions.
When jihadist groups target those same nationalists, the state shrugs, hides behind claims of helplessness, and often refuses to investigate meaningfully. Such selective repression is not accidental but systematic policy.
The human cost of this policy is immense. Families in Balochistan live under constant fear, not only of Army raids but also of extremist bombings.
Political life is suffocated from both directions. The BNP-M attack is only one in a series of violent incidents where secular or nationalist actors have borne the brunt of terrorist violence while the state looks the other way. Journalists who try to expose these links face censorship, threats, and exile. Human rights activists are silenced under draconian laws.
Meanwhile, the Army continues to present itself as the victim of “foreign conspiracies” while engaging in its own brutal repression at home. The rise of ISKP-ISPP in Pakistan cannot be separated from the Army’s regional games. With the Taliban returning to power in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s military establishment initially celebrated, believing it had regained “strategic depth.” But that move has backfired, as ISKP has positioned itself as the Taliban’s rival, seeking recruits in Pakistan’s own backyard.
Rather than genuinely confronting this threat, the Army seems to have redirected it against the Baloch. In doing so, it not only undermines the Baloch struggle but also exposes the entire region to the dangers of an expanding ISIS affiliate.
This reckless gamble shows how deeply entrenched the Pakistan Army’s hostility toward Baloch nationalism is, that it would risk international terrorism spreading further just to weaken an ethnic movement seeking autonomy. The BNP-M bombing reveals the hollowness of Pakistan’s counterterrorism claims.
If the state cannot protect a peaceful political rally in the heart of Quetta, then what exactly is the purpose of the massive military infrastructure in the province? The answer lies in priorities: the Army is not in Balochistan to protect its people but to control its resources and crush dissent.
Gas, copper, gold, and the strategic coastline of Gwadar are what truly matter to Rawalpindi. The people themselves are expendable, whether they are victims of enforced disappearances by soldiers or bombings by jihadists.
The Army’s collaboration—active or passive—with ISKP-ISPP is simply another layer of exploitation against a people who have been treated as colonial subjects within their own land.
The international community must recognize this reality. Treating Pakistan solely as a partner in counterterrorism is a dangerous illusion.
The Quetta bombing should be read as a warning that the Pakistan Army’s games with jihadists are far from over. By enabling ISKP-ISPP to target Baloch groups, the Army is exporting instability beyond its borders, as these groups inevitably link up with transnational networks.
Allowing this duplicity to go unchecked only emboldens the generals who thrive on perpetual crises. For the Baloch, however, the message is devastating. Even participation in electoral politics, as BNP-M has attempted, cannot guarantee safety from terror.
The Army’s strategy leaves them trapped between the hammer of military repression and the anvil of jihadist violence.
This is by design, as it seeks to erode the very possibility of a political solution to the Baloch question. In such an environment, more young Baloch may feel driven to abandon peaceful politics altogether, further fueling conflict.
The real responsibility for this lies not with the victims but with the state that has weaponized extremism for its own survival. The September 2025 attack should therefore not be viewed as an isolated atrocity but as part of a structural pattern of state behavior. The Pakistan Army, far from being the protector of the nation, has become its greatest destabilizer.
By fostering jihadist groups while crushing nationalist ones, it has turned Balochistan into a battleground where the voices of its people are drowned out by explosions and gunfire.
Until this militarized policy is confronted, both within Pakistan and internationally, the cycle of violence will continue. The BNP-M rally bombing is a grim reminder that Pakistan’s generals are not interested in peace, stability, or democracy in Balochistan.
Their interest lies in domination, and for that they will collaborate with any force, no matter how extremist, as long as it helps them maintain their grip.
The blood spilled in Quetta is therefore not only on the hands of ISKP-ISPP but also on the hands of the Pakistan Army, whose policies created the conditions for this attack.
As long as Rawalpindi views Baloch nationalism as an existential enemy and jihadists as useful instruments, the people of Balochistan will remain trapped in a cycle of state repression and extremist terror.
The world must finally call out this dangerous duplicity, for the price of silence is paid in human lives.
–IANS
scor/